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A closed, backward society where stoning, flogging and 
limb amputations are rampant and women’s rights a forbidden 
concept.  This is the image of Saudi Arabia that human 
rights groups and media reports often present.  At the 
heart of this “medieval” society lies the notorious 
Sharia'a, causing the human rights violations we have grown 
so accustomed to associating the country with.  However, 
there is little recognition attributed to another country 
in the Middle East, whose government also imposes strict 
Islamic Law on its citizens: Iran.  Rarely are its stoning 
incidents or executions mentioned yet they occur with 
higher frequency and severity than those of the Desert 
Kingdom.   
 
Human rights itself is a new legal concept; “the 
placing of legal constraints on the power of the modern 
nation state”1and officially defined only fifty-seven years 
ago.  It still requires many adjustments in an age where 
the still-undefined act of terrorism, infringes closely on 
its territory.  Much like the Western legal system has 
recently been accommodating to human rights as enforceable 
justice, Islamic Law too has transcended far from its 
 
1 Mayer, Elizabeth Ann.  Islam & Human Rights: Tradition and Politics.   
 Westview Press, Inc.  Colorado: 1991. 
traditionally tribal foundations.  The clash between 
civilizations is most reflective in this matter where one 
society’s advancement is seen as prompting another to 
abandon its culture and traditional way of life.  In fact, 
an important argument regarding the universality of human 
rights was made by Iran’s UN representative, Sai Rajaie-
Khorassani when he defended his country’s human rights 
violations.  Khorassani paraphrased statement read, “…apart 
from Islamic law…conventions, declarations and resolutions 
or decisions of international organizations, which were 
contrary to Islam, had no validity in the Islamic Republic 
of Iran…The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 
which represented secular understanding of the Judeo-
Christian tradition, could not be implemented by Muslims 
and did not accord with the system of values recognized by 
the Islamic Republic of Iran; his country would therefore 
not hesitate to violate its provisions.”2 This argument 
parallels those made by Saudi Arabia during the drafting of 
the UDHR.  According to the Kingdom’s representative, it 
reflected Western culture and was “at variance with 
 
2 United Nations General Assembly.  Thirty-Ninth Session.  Third Committee.  65th meeting, held on 
Friday, 7 December 1984 at 3 p.m.  New York.  A/C.3/39/SR.65. 
patterns of culture of Eastern States” and due to the 
provisions for religious liberty violating Islamic law.3
The cultural-relativism argument as applied to the Middle 
East is extraneous after the 1981 formulation of the 
Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (claimed to be based on 
the Qur’an), which attests that human rights standards 
developed in the United Nations are compatible with Islamic 
Law.  The Declaration’s fundamental guarantees include the 
right to “due process of the Law,” under all provisions of 
Article V.  Article III.a states that, “All persons are 
equal before the Law and are entitled to equal 
opportunities and protection of the Law,” and “entitled to 
equal wages” (III.b).  The Declaration prohibits torture 
(Article VII), provides the right to asylum (Article IX), 
and allows for rights of minorities with freedom of own 
laws in a Muslim country (Article X.b).  Further, the 
Declaration allows for the right to freedom of belief, 
thought and speech (Article XII), religion (Article XIV), 
protection of property (Article XVI), education (Article 
XXI), and freedom of movement and residence (Article 
XXIII).  With exception to the Qur’an-ic and Muslim 
 
3 John Kelsay, “Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” in Human Rights 
and the Conflict of Cultures: Western and Islamic Perspectives on Religious Liberty, David Little, John 
Kelsay, and Abdulaziz Sachedina, eds. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988), 35-35. 
references, one can easily see that the Islamic Declaration 
of Human Rights has little to contrast with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.  Although Saudi Arabia had 
sponsored the drafting of this Declaration, fifty-seven 
states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference have 
not yet ratified it. 
 
In this study, I will attempt to disqualify the common 
perception of Saudi Arabia as the worst human rights 
violator in forms the region due to governance under 
standard Islamic Law, while comparing it to Iran; the 
world’s other most infamous advocates of Islamic 
jurisprudence. 
Origins of the Sharia'a 
 
Islam originated in Saudi Arabia as a religion, but 
the administration of Sharia'a was formally initiated c. 
1927 with aims of unifying the kingdom’s existing three 
judicial systems.  As the country where Islam was founded 
and where its prophet Muhammad received his revelations 
that would later form the basics of Islamic jurisprudence, 
Saudi Arabia has the closest ties to it.  However, a Middle 
Eastern, Muslim country ruled by religious clerics also has 
claim to it, more so than perhaps the institution of 
Sharia'a in Canada (according to the Canadian Law Times, 
recent changes in the Canadian Arbitration Act provide for 
courts to enforce agreements conceded with the application 
of Sharia'a).  While not in its present condition, a form 
of Islamic rule in Saudi Arabia dates back to the life of 
Muhammad, while in Iran, its strictest form was not 
initiated until the rule of Ayatollah Khomeini and his 
suspension of all un-Islamic laws.  The Sharia’a is 
politically ingrained in both societies where the Saudi 
government claims its constitution is the Qur’an and Iran’s 
1979 constitution explicitly provides in Article 4 for 
political, military, cultural, administrative, economic, 
financial, penal, civil and any other laws to be based on 
Islamic criteria. Additionally, both governments declare 
the official state religion to be Islam.  
The schools of the Sharia 
 
The word Sharia’a has romantic meanings in Arabic such 
as “the right path” and “the path to water.”  It is the 
traditional law as derived and interpreted by scholars of 
the Qur’an (the word of God given to Muhammad) as well as 
Muhammad’s sayings and traditions as recorded in the 
Hadith.  No detailed legal code exists. There is merely an 
existence of basic moral standards that humans should 
conduct themselves by.  
 
What many fail to realize about the Sharia’a, is that 
it is a legal system applied mainly through four distinctly 
different schools of interpretation (madhab). Each one has 
evolved through hundreds of years of scholarly debate and 
analysis, dominating a particular region.  These particular 
versions are named after the revolutionary scholars who led 
the foundations of Islamic legal interpretation (ijtihad).  
They were each other’s contemporaries, yet their ideas did 
not intervene with each other.  They enriched each others’ 
studies and remained in peaceful coexistence serving a 
common purpose of justice.  After all, one of the 
fundamental principles of the Sharia’a is the concept of 
consensus (ijima). The legal scholars include Abu Hanifa 
(d. 767) a Persian whose determinations and subsequent 
‘Hanifa school’ were most prominent in the Levant and 
Iraq’s Kufa region; Malik B. Anas (d. 796) of the ‘Maliki 
school’ centered in Medina and now dominant in North-West 
and Central Africa; Muhammad ibn Idris al Shafi (d. 820) of 
the ‘Shafi school’ dominant in East Africa and parts of 
Saudi Arabia; and Ahmad B. Hanbal (d. 855) founder of the 
Hanbali school of Saudi Arabia.   
 
It is important to note however, that although these 
schools of Sharia’a are considered the most legitimate and 
widely accepted ones within the dominant Sunni sect of 
Islam, various others remain popular within Shia dominated 
countries.  In Iran, the predominant school of Sharia 
interpretation (madhab) is the Jafari (aka Twelvers, Ithna 
Asharia) sect of the Shia with a small minority belonging 
to the Hanafi school.  The Shia Twelvers abide by two main 
schools of thought, the Usuli and the Akhbari with the 
first being dominant and more liberal in application and 
interpretation. 
 
Vast differences occur within the Sunni and Jafari 
madhabs with the Jafari school being much more literal in 
its interpretation of the Qur’an.  This is surprising since 
the Sunni Hanafi and Maliki schools of thought were 
students under Imam Jafar Sadiq.  The differences result 
mainly from alternate interpretations of the Qur’an and 
Hadith (and the veracity of several Hadith) but also due to 
the Shia’s non-acceptance of verdicts presented by the 
first three Caliphs, Abu Bakr, Omar and Uthman.  In Sharia, 
the resulting differences can be as dramatic as the 
legality of temporary marriage.  The Jafari interpretation 
allows for this concept (known as mu’ta) but the Sunni 
strongly oppose it (due to the verdicts of Omar).  Muta
does not require a divorce to terminate it and can be for a 
limited amount of time as short as one evening.  The 
offspring of such a marriage would be considered as 
legitimate heirs.  Another difference is the acceptance of 
the dissimulation of faith, taqqiya, when faced with 
danger.  While a Jafari may deny his faith and even assume 
a false one, such an act is inconceivable to a Sunni.  An 
important difference in jurisprudence lies in the Shia 
division between divine justice and an individual’s 
responsibility for his actions.  The Sunni however, believe 
man’s exercise of free will is limited by God.  For these 
differences as well as several others (such as prayer 
form), the Jafari are sometimes referred to by the Sunni as 
rafidi, meaning rejecters.  They reject important beliefs 
and therefore are heretics.   
 
On most issues, the four Sunni schools of the Sharia 
agree with each other especially in modern times where they 
have disappeared most distinguishable boundaries.  Yet 
although the schools have mostly combined, it has been done 
in different ways throughout the region, with influences 
such as the 18th century Wahhabi interpretation and 
customary tribal law in Arabia.  However, traditional 
Sharia madhab had certain differences in issues of 
marriage, divorce and bequethment that were fundamental.  
(Due to the influence of Hanbali thought in Saudi Arabian 
and Hanafi on Iran, I will focus solely on their 
disparities.) 
 
In traditional Islam (as well as even in modern times 
of the Western world) the intent of crime and morality is 
of great concern with implications on sentencing.  The 
schools of the Sharia diverge on the importance they place 
in criminal intent with priority given to civil injury and 
concern about repayment (blood money) to the injured party.  
One moralistic approach (by Hanbali law) believes that a 
criminal act of an individual is dependant upon his 
intended motives.  The second formalist approach dominates 
Hanafi law and it claims that it is not the law’s 
responsibility to intrude into the human mind and decipher 
what someone was thinking.  It takes actions at face value. 
 
In regards to marriage, all Sunni schools claim that 
the contract is a lifelong commitment and therefore 
statures indicating it to be temporary, are a nullity.  
Hanbali law goes further and claims marriage to be annulled 
if there is no indication of a time limit but evidence 
attests to parties’ intent of a temporary union.  Whereas 
in Hanafi law, the irrelevance of intention leads such a 
contract (if stipulated in accordance with the law) to be 
perfectly valid. 
 
Another important difference due to the debated 
relevance of intention arises in the law of bequests.  
Under traditional Sharia, a bequest made for an illegal 
purpose such as a distillery or brothel is considered null 
and void. Under specifically Hanbali law, a bequest 
inspired by an improper motive is also invalid.  Payment 
for the construction of a brother or the services of a 
liquor supplier would be void and punishable due to the 
payer’s intentions and rewarding of illegal conduct. 
 
Various loopholes (hiyal) had evolved in the strict 
confines of traditional Islamic jurisprudence, which defy 
the fundamental principle of Sharia, which is to serve 
toward the purpose of what God ultimate intention.  This 
can be illustrated in the following examples:  According to 
Islamic law, the charging of interest on a capital loan is 
illegal. One could get around this by performing a double 
sale.  If a loan was made for $100 for one year with an 
interest rate of 20 percent, two transactions would be made 
in its place.  The first would involve a sale of an object 
for $120 to the borrower, payable within one year.  The 
next immediate transaction would be the sale of the object 
back to the moneylender for $100 cash, leaving the borrower 
with $100 in cash and a legal obligation to repay $120 
within one year. 
 
Another example of hiyal can be found in family law.  
After a husband divorces his wife by repudiation three 
times for whatever reason, he is unable to remarry her.  
The former wife can only become “available” once she 
remarries, consummates the marriage, and is divorced 
through due process.  To avoid such wait and humiliation 
after an unthoughtful repudiation made in anger, the 
practice of tahlil arose.  Tahlil is the process of making 
the wife legal again through a trick marriage involving a 
hired third party (often below the age of puberty), known 
as a muhallil. Such shams of hiyal are condemned by the 
Hanbali and Maliki schools but widely accepted by the very 
literal Hanafi and Shafi. 
 
Traditionally in Arabia, courts were provided for 
whichever school an individual belonged to.  One could even 
change his allegiance to a school depending on his stance 
on a particular issue.  Often this caused problems when 
done in convenience with leniency in applicable punishment.   
Freedom to a Fair Trial 
 
The Saudi Arabian Committee for the Promotion of 
Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (better known as the 
mutawwa’in) is infamous for incidents such as the one that 
occurred on March 11, 2002 in Mecca.  Fourteen young girls 
died after being beaten and chased back to their burning 
school building due to displaying improper attire in 
public.  These incidents increase during Ramadan, when they 
believe they possess special authority to enforce 
conservativeness.  Their headquarters are located in a 
group of building s called as-Sa'ah Square, an area that 
also houses in the infamous “Chop Chop Square.”  The square 
is known as such due to the beheadings that are carried out 
within it, for public display of revolutionary justice.  As 
extremist as their measures may be, traditional Islam had 
in fact provided for a special public office to ensure 
public observance of moral and religious standards.  In 
accordance with the Qur’an the Muhtasib’s mission was, 
“Urging to the good and dissuading from the bad”(al-amr
bi’l-ma’ruf wa’l-nahy ‘an al-munkar). Their authority on 
punishment was limited.  
 
Iran has its own version of the Saudi mutawaiin, 
recently expanded with an additional morality police 
referred to as the “special police” (yegan ha-ye vizhe).  
Its goal is “Enjoining the Good and Prohibiting the 
Forbidden” (Amr be Ma’ruf va Nahi as Monkar). There have 
been several reports of the force beating individuals for 
listening to music and the wearing of makeup or immodest 
apparel.  As with Saudi Arabia, the month of Ramadan allows 
for additional restriction.  This is exemplified by the 
November 11, 2004 incident in Sanandaj, where a 14-year old 
Kurdish boy was caught breaking fast.  He died after 
receiving 85 lashes, as ordered by a judge.  
 
The role of today’s Islamic enforcement police is as a 
semiautonomous agency aimed at ensuring public adherence to 
morality (conservative Islam) and apprehending those that 
disobey. In Saudi Arabia they can detain their captive for 
up to twenty-four hours after executing an arrest only with 
the presence of a police officer.  Once apprehended an 
individual is imprisoned within the hierarchical Saudi 
court system, which is comprised of the Expeditious courts, 
the Sharia’a courts and the Commission on Judicial 
Supervision.  In certain regions of Arabia, the Shia are 
provided with their own courts for domestic disputes and 
inheritance.  However, only two judges are available for 
the Shia-dominated Eastern province.  The Expeditious 
Courts handle simple and civilian cases divided among Saudi 
nationals/non-nationals and nomads.  The Sharia’a courts’ 
jurisdiction includes everything else.  Within them, the 
Supreme Judicial Council is responsible for reviewing cases 
involving stoning, amputation and death sentences.  The 
Judicial Supervision ensures that justice within the court 
system is maintained and it reviews the judges.  An 
important role is also played by the Council of Senior 
Religious Scholars (Ulama), an autonomous body of 20 
religious jurists, including the Minister of Justice who 
influences society aspects such as the judicial system, all 
levels of religious education, notaries public, preaching 
of Islam abroad, supervision of girls’ education and 
implementation of the rules of the Sharia’a. They interpret 
the Sharia’a for the lower courts. 
 
The Iranian court structure includes seventy branches 
of the Revolutionary Courts; Public Courts consisting of 
Civil (205), Special Civil (99), 1st Class Criminal (86) and 
2nd Class Criminal (156); Courts of Peace, which include 
Ordinary (124), Independent Courts of Peace (125), and 
Supreme Courts of Cassation (22).  The Guardian Council 
(GC) is the highest legislative body appointed by the 
Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution (similar in nature 
and responsibility to the Saudi Ulama.) 
 
Iran’s vast array of court categories allows for the 
activity of many human rights lawyers, several of them 
famed throughout the Western World, such as Shireen Ebadi 
who often calls for Iran to abandon its harsh prison 
practices. With much restriction, Iran allows certain NGOs 
to function such as the Iranian Jurists Association for the 
Defense of Human Rights and the Association for the Defense 
of Prisoners’ Rights.  
 
Saudi Arabia’s first human rights NGO formally 
permitted to operate within the country has recently been 
launched.  The National Society for Human Rights (NSHR), 
includes three women on its board.  Its affiliation with 
the government is questionable due to the chairman being a 
member of the government-appointed Shura council.  The 
organization began by addressing prison conditions and 
extensive detentions.  Their December 2004 report confirmed 
the existence of prolonged detention of expatriates often 
due to sponsor’s refusal to issue travel tickets. 
 
Human rights organizations often report on the use of 
torture in prisons as well as for extraction of confession.  
Although the Criminal Procedure section of Saudi Arabia’s 
Basic Law formally prohibits torture and it is prohibited 
to accept a forced confession by the Sharia itself, these 
incidents still occur.  They are most frequent in the very 
conservative central region especially in the city of 
Riyadh, while rare in the East and West regions.  In both 
Iran and Saudi Arabia, Non-Arabic speakers often suffer 
most when presented with a document termed as their release 
papers.  They later find out the document they signed was 
actually a confession. 
Trial Process 
 
A public trial is provided for by Islamic Law, however 
this is seldom observed.  Both Saudi Arabia and Iran rarely 
provide for media presence or even lawyers inside of a 
courtroom.  Although there are is no provision for juries 
within Sharia since it is up to the judge to survey the 
presented evidence and make a decision, the defendant does 
have a right of appeal to higher courts. 
 
Although human rights lawyers practice in both 
countries, their presence does not necessarily provide for 
completely fair trials or treatment of prisoners.  Saudi 
Basic Law prohibits arbitrary arrest or a detention period 
exceeding five days without charges being filed.  There is 
an exception regarding persons openly criticizing the 
government or attempting to destabilize it.  A usual 
detention lasts two months followed by a trial or 
deportation.  The Kingdom follows a tradition of releasing 
prisoners during the holy months of Ramadan.  Minor crimes 
allow for the practice of bail, which can even be omitted 
in certain cases for release on recognizance by patron or 
sponsor.  International standards are generally met by the 
prisons, with inmates residing in air conditioned cells 
with good nutrition, required exercise regiment and guard 
patrols for safety.  These conditions account for the 
current overcrowding in jails due to inmates’ refusal to 
leave after sentence completion.  Human Rights Watch 
estimates eighty percent of inmates to be non-Saudi.  The 
Shia also comprise a considerable portion of the population 
due to the Hanbali interpretation, in which judges can 
discount their testimony on account of them being “non-
Muslim.”  
 
Iranian prison conditions are incomparable to the 
Saudi system.  In addition to extensive solitary 
confinement, inmates suffer from poor nutrition and lack of 
medical care.  The prison population is believed to be 
extremely overcrowded reaching an estimated 133,658 
prisoners in spaces capable of holding a maximum of 65,000.  
The United Nations 7th Survey results published in the World 
Prison Population List (4th Edition) report Iran’s inmate 
record to total 163,526 (229 per 100,000 people) in 2004 
compared to Saudi Arabia’s total of 23,720 (110 per 
100,000) in 2000.  However, these numbers are still 
shadowed under the country with the highest prison 
population in the world; the United States with a 
staggering 1.96 million inmates (686 per 100,000). 
 
In Saudi Arabia and Iran, prisoners have been reported 
by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (among many 
others) to be held incommunicado for extensive amounts of 
time.  Torture as a method of extracting confessions, 
information and as a form of recreation by prison guards, 
is frequently employed in both countries.  Iran has adopted 
in May of 2004 the Law on Respect of Lawful Liberties and 
Protection of Citizenship Rights and Saudi Arabia ratified 
in 1997 the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention 
against Torture).  In Iran, “Unofficial” secret prisons 
outside the national prison system are common, such as 
“Prison 5” and “Amaken.”  Their captives report of being 
held in prolonged solitary confinement with complete 
sensory deprivation, threatened with execution, burned, and 
suffering death and blindness as a result of extreme 
beatings.  Surprisingly, medical leave from prison is 
allowable in Iran, especially if the government is unable 
to treat a medical condition on premises. 
 
Throughout the country there have been several 
Committees for Collection of Donations for Impoverished 
Prisoners that raise funds, since an inmate remains 
imprisoned until his fine is paid.  This mainly applies to 
civil cases and traffic accidents since more serious crimes 
require more serious punishment such as flogging where 
lashes usually are incurred in the amount of a few dozen to 
a few hundred, often to be administered at 50 lashes every 
two weeks.  The highest amount of lashes recorded by 
Amnesty International was 4,000 imposed on Egyptian 
national, Muhammad ‘Ali al-Sayyid convicted of robbery in 
1990.  Considerably, Saudi Arabia’s courts provide a 
physician to ensure an individual’s physical condition can 
withstand the designated amount.   
 
Judgments in Saudi Arabia include punishments of 
fines, prison terms, flogging, amputation and/or execution.  
Amputations occur after repeated incidents of thievery, 
usually after the third time.  Criminal punishments in Iran 
are executed in a similar manner. The country imposes the 
death penalty for murder, armed robbery, rape, blasphemy 
and smuggling drugs if the quantity held is in excess of 11 
pounds of opium.   In 2003 the country sentenced to death 
by stoning at least four prisoners (guilty of rape and 
adultery), at least 197 were to be flogged and 11 for 
amputation of fingers and limbs.  
 
Under Islamic Law, judgments for crimes causing injury 
or death to another individual may be avoided by the 
injured party’s (or their family’s) acceptance of blood 
money (diyeh), an ancient tribal custom. However, amounts 
awarded change with the nationality, religion, sex and age 
of the victim.  A Muslim male receives 100% of the 
requested compensation amount; a male Jew/Christian 
receives 50%; all others (even Hindus, which Sharia’a 
considers to be polytheists) receive 1/16th. Women are 
entitled to 50% of each category of religious affiliation.  
Iran’s Expediency Council, with its power to finalize 
legislation, concluded provisions for equalizing diyeh
compensation among non-Muslim victims. 
 
When diyeh for a murder or rape is unacceptable, the 
perpetrator is executed by hanging, stoning, or beheading. 
There are only 120 countries in the world today that have 
formally abolished the death penalty in law or practice.  
And although neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran are part of this 
list, Saudi Arabia surprisingly is not the highest 
contender.  According to Amnesty International, in 2004, 
first place was received by China with a minimum of 3,400 
executions, Iran came second with over 159 (at least 108 in 
2003), followed by Vietnam with over 64, USA with 59 
(together accounting for 97% of the world’s executions) and 
finally Saudi Arabia with an estimated 33, including one 
woman.  Executions were for severe crimes such as murder, 
narcotics-related charges, rape and armed robbery.  In 
Saudi Arabia, before the sentences can actually be carried 
out, permission in the form of a Royal Decree issued by the 
King is necessary. 
 
Women are not exempt from execution and are even 
targeted if presumed indecent.  In August of 2004, the 
Iranian media reported the public hanging of a mentally 
incompetent 16-year old Atequeh Rajabi after she was 
charged with “actions incompatible with chastity.”  Her 
male accomplice was released after receiving 100 lashes.  
Under the Sharia adultery or incompatibility with chastity 
must be proved by four witnesses of good character.  As is 
often the case, it is questionable if these witnesses were 
produced for Rajabi’s trial.  
Rights of Women 
 
In a perfect society all of human kind has equal 
rights indeterminate of sex, ethnicity or religious 
affiliation.  Neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran can be deemed 
as perfect societies since in both, half of an entire 
population is restricted from basic freedoms.  In Arabia 
women have always suffered severely (by Western standards) 
due to ancient tribal customs still prevalent today and 
reflected in the country’s predominant madhab. However, 
Iran has been closely catching up with its restrictions 
since the Islamic Revolution. 
 
According to Sharia’a, women are prohibited from 
marrying non-Muslims, however men are allowed to due to 
religion being passed on from the patriarch. 
 
Travel in both countries for women is restricted 
unless they provide authorization by a make relative, 
husband or sponsor.  This is applicable also to foreign 
women married to Saudi nationals.  Strides have been made 
towards women’s citizenship rights with the allowance of 
their obtaining own identity cards from male relatives or 
guardians beginning in 2001.  For Saudi women, travel 
within the country is also limited to the necessity of a 
male driver.  A convoy of women demonstrated against this 
prohibition on November 6, 1990 when they drove on a 
highway in Riyadh.  After their husbands signed to have 
them released from arrest by promising they would not 
violate the ban, the customary rule became explicitly 
written. 
 
A quiet yet serious problem for women in the Kingdom 
has been domestic abuse.  This issue receives little 
attention due to the government’s lack of keeping 
statistics on it.  Hospitals report it is a frequent 
occurrence and suspicious injuries now require reporting to 
the authorities.  This issue gained international attention 
when a prominent Saudi reporter, Rania al Baz, made 
headlines after allowing photos to be taken of her 
drastically bruised face. 
___________________________________________________________
Freedom of Press and Religion 
 
Saudi Arabia’s freedom of the press is limited due to the 
Ministry of Information’s power to appoint and remove any 
and all editors-in-chief and the strict enforcement of 
censoring all “immoral” images and references.  All media 
entering the Kingdom is channeled through a college of 
theology located in northern Riyadh known as the Imam 
Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University.  It was formed in 
order to solve the youth unemployment problem.  Journalism 
has gained freedom recently when in February of 2003, the 
Saudi Government granted a charter to a professional 
journalists’ association, which includes both men and 
women. 
 
Criticism of the government is forbidden under Article 
12 of the Saudi Basic Law under prevention of “anything 
that may lead to disunity, sedition, and separation.”  The 
Saudi government continuously censors all media references 
to politics, non-Islamic religions, pork or pigs, alcohol 
and sex.  These precautions have little effect of a society 
facing the ‘Al-Jazeera Effect’ due to the numerous 
satellite dishes throughout the kingdom. 
 
Satellite dishes are banned in Iran and the government 
also is on a continuous crusade to control public morality 
by enforcing strict media censorship.  Punishment for the 
ownership of a satellite dish can consist of a four month 
prison sentence in addition to 80 lashes, as was the case 
of Mohsen Mofidi in 2004. Mofidi died in the hospital upon 
his release.  In Saudi Arabia, Satellite dishes are 
forbidden in theory but this is seldom enforced.  Due to 
the advent of the internet, both countries have had to take 
extra measures to contain the information and websites 
flowing in.  Saudi Arabia’s precautions include the 
connection of all ISP’s to the outside world through a bank 
of servers in the King Abdul Aziz City of Science and 
Technology.  Satellite links for connectors are a strategy 
often employed to get around this system. 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
Religion 
 
Article 12 of the Iranian constitution provides for 
schools of law and religion in addition to Sharia’a, to be 
granted complete respect and freedom of practice, including 
matters of personal status.  Such statements contradict the 
reported abuses of religious minorities in Iran that 
include Zoroastrians, Christians, Jews and the Baha'is.  
However, it is the Baha’i minority that has suffered the 
most. 
 
The persecution of the Baha’i minority in Iran was 
occurring even a century before the 1979 Revolution and the 
ascent to power by the Ayatollah Khomeini. The religion’s 
origins date back to 1863 and so does its persecution.  The 
Baha’i were seen as conspirators against the Islamic 
Republic, aiding what would later be termed, “The Great 
Satan” – the United States.  Often they were denied the use 
of any communication such as radio, television, newspapers, 
films, literature or newspapers through which they could 
voice concerns of their treatment to the outside world. 
With the onset of the Revolution and rule by the Sharia, 
religious minorities (Christians, Zoroastrians and Jews) 
were considered “protected” under the law, but not equal 
The 1979 Constitution makes a reference to “equal rights” 
being enjoyed by all citizens, clauses specifically list 
the above referenced selected minorities only.  The Baha’i 
did not enjoy this privilege and the Shia clergy of Iran 
stated, “Under even the old Constitution, the Baha’is 
should have had no civil rights; the limited freedom they 
had to exercise civil functions, therefore, was proof that 
they had enjoyed a privileged position.”  They began to be 
persecuted more than ever.  They suffered expulsion from 
businesses, torched homes, physical abuse and mosque 
propaganda claiming them to be “enemies of Islam,” “corrupt 
on earth,” and persons “whose blood deserves to be shed.” 
 
The most serious of persecutions against the Baha’i 
occurred through the government’s legislature.  Their 
marriages were considered null and void with martial life 
being considered as prostitution (for which punishment is 
execution). Children of a Baha’i marriage were considered 
illegitimate and had no rights to inheritance and were 
often expelled from school due to their religious 
affiliation.  The Baha’i religion dictates complete 
submission to government and therefore did not rebel 
against their persecutors.  The religion’s founder 
established the belief among his followers that “it is 
better to be killed than to kill.”  
 
Continuing persecution was claimed to result from the 
Baha’i community’s association with the “Westernization” of 
Iran.  Such accusations arose from the Baha’i belief system 
that promotes the equality of women, democracy, and 
scientific investigation.  Refusal to recant the Baha’i 
faith can result in death, as experienced by ten Baha’i 
women who were hung on June 18, 1983.  Three days prior, 
six men related to the victims, were executed as well. The 
following August, the Baha’i religion was formally banned 
in Iran.  In compliance with the government, the Baha’i 
National Spiritual Assembly and all locals were dissolved.  
A letter to the Iranian government stated the community’s 
complete submission and expressed hope of allowance to 
worship in private.  Prompt arrests of the members were 
carried out. 
Several investigations of the Baha’i persecutions by 
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights have been 
undertaken since 1986.  The Commission reported as recently 
as 1993 that executions for affiliation with the Baha’i 
religion were still occurring.  On March 10, 1993 during 
the 49th Session of the Commission, a resolution was passed 
stating, “there was no appreciable progress in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran towards improving compliance with human 
rights standards in conformity with international 
instruments.”  Viewed as a “false religion” that poses a 
threat to pure Islamic life, the Baha’i are still 
persecuted throughout the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
 
As a Sunni dominated country, Saudi Arabia has its own 
targeted minority; the Shia. However, unlike in Iran, this 
persecuted minority is allowed to travel freely outside of 
the country in order to worship and participate in 
religious celebrations, such as Ashura (which recently was 
even celebrated within the Kingdom).  Restrictions such as 
banning of Shia books still do occur. The Ismaili 
(Seveners) sect of Shia Islam is particularly suffering 
human rights violations due to their interpretation of 
Islam, which includes practices that may be considered as 
performing “sorcery.”  The Saudi interpretation of the 
Sharia considers religions of the occult such as black 
magic, witchcraft and voodoo to be considered “sorcery” and 
the worst form of polytheism, punishable with death.  In 
extreme cases, the Saudi government has even not recognized 
the Shia as Muslims at all. Therefore, in a court of Sharia 
law, their testimony is inadmissible.  
 
Freedom of religion for minorities (Christians and 
Jews[if allowed into the Kingdom])is limited to private 
worship (with an undefined distinction between private and 
public) but the boundary is drawn with conversion.  
Converting from Islam to another religion is considered 
apostasy, a crime under Sharia, and punishable with death 
in both Iran and Saudi Arabia.  While Saudi Arabia does not 
allow for public practice of religions outside of Islam, 
they have allowed for Shia mosques to be constructed.  This 
offer was declined due to the exception of displaying 
motifs, a Shia practice forbidden by Sunni Islam. The Sunni 
of Iran have recently been able to voice criticism over the 
lack of a Sunni mosque in Tehran, where their population 
reaches one million. 
Progress 
Iran has adopted in May of 2004 the Law on Respect of 
Lawful Liberties and Protection of Citizenship Rights.  A 
parliamentary bill for its accession to the UN Convention 
against Torture and the UN Women’s Convention was rejected 
by the GC in August of 2003. 
 
In January of 1996, Saudi Arabia had ratified the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.  It has also 
ratified the International Convention for the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women and the Convention against Torture. There is further 
consideration of ratifying the International Covenants on 
Human Rights (ICCPR and ICESCR).  There has been little 
indication that any of these conventions have had an 
influence on the Kingdom’s human rights practices. 
 
Beginning in February of 2005 municipal elections were 
held throughout the Saudi Kingdom with only half the 178 
seats being appointed for the four-year terms.  Although 
prisoners were allowed to vote, women and members of the 
armed forces were not.  While focusing on the negative 
aspect of prohibiting women from voting this year due to 
logistical issues of separation, many fail to notice that 
these are actually the second municipal elections in Saudi 
Arabia.  Saudi municipal elections were held as early as 
1954 and continued through the early 1960s under the reign 
of King Saud ibn Abdul Aziz.  Little is known about the 
reasons for their introduction or conclusion, but they did 
exist.  
 
Saudi Arabia has taken many other improvements in the 
field of human rights.  In the city of Qatif the February 
2004 celebrations of the Shia holy day of Ashura proceeded 
with no governmental harassment.  This is particularly 
important since this holy day commemorates the martyrdom of 
Hussein ibn Ali at the 10th of Muharram (Ashura).   
 
For the first time in 2003, the Jeddah Economic Forum 
devoted an entire day to the discussion of women in 
domestic and international business. 
 
In October of 2004 the Saudi government amended a 
naturalization law allowing for citizenship of foreign 
long-term residents. 
 
Many question the effects on a society of imposition 
and strict interpretation of Sharia.  As in another region, 
this can be judged by deterrence from criminal activity.  
Simply, if the punishments are harsh enough to deter 
criminals from pursuing their illegal activities, then the 
justice system is working (of course as long as the system 
has no negative implications on the innocent).  Both Saudi 
Arabia and Iran are closed societies that do not make their 
governmental records official.  The Transparency 
International CPI Score in 2004 for Saudi Arabia was 3.4 
(O- highly corrupt, 10-highly clean).  The country was in 
company with China and Syria as number 71.  As for Iran, 
its score was 2.9 and it was ranked number 87 along with 
the Dominican Republic and Romania.   
 
Due to the corruption and lack of transparency within 
these governments, it is most difficult to obtain official 
and correct data pertaining to any negative aspect of their 
societies.  However, it is claimed by visitors, citizens 
and residents of the Kingdom (interviewed by me) that the 
criminal activity is practically nonexistent.  This may be 
explained by the necessity of depositing your passport with 
a pre-approved sponsor upon entering the Kingdom in 
addition to the necessity of an “exit visa”.  Since an 
estimated seven million of the country’s current estimated 
population of 27 million is foreigners, any crime on their 
behalf is a risk with unattractive consequences.  The 
country claims that their justice system has had a 
deterrent effect.  A year after instating the death penalty 
for drug-related crimes (usage and sale), the country’s 
drug usage has decreased by a rate of 26% and subsequently 
lowering the addiction rate by almost 60%.  Additionally, 
the Kingdom reports in 2000 to have had 616 murder cases.  
With the population at an estimated 22 million in that 
year, this would provide a murder rate of 2.8 per 100,000 
(half the rate of the United States). 
 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia may have a dramatically 
negative image in the area of human rights.  Its legal 
system calls for just trials and punishments under the 
presumption of fair judges acting in accordance with the 
presets of the Qur’an.  In comparison to Iran, the 
kingdom’s violations are not exceptional and even less 
severe in certain cases.  It’s image perhaps arises from 
its violations occurring simply more outright than those of 
the Western World, which itself has participated in 
genocide, slavery, racism, religious persecution, torture, 
colonialism, and the ignoring of inhabitants’ rights.  
While prison torture in the West (i.e. the Abu Ghraib 
prison scandal) is a hidden concept from the public, 
beheadings in Saudi Arabia are a spectator event for the 
public held weekly on Friday’s at “Chop Chop Square.”  
Perhaps it is the shamelessness of these violations that 
gives it the negative image the Kingdom and not the acts 
themselves.  
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